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The chapter by Dills, Miron, and Summers (hereafter “DMS”) grabs attention through 
provocative claims about economists’ ignorance when it comes to “the main factors 
identified in the economics of crime literature as key determinants of crime.”  The 
exception offered to this nihilistic conclusion is a finding that drug prohibition generates 
violence, a result that has been documented by (among others) one of the authors of this 
paper, Miron.    
 
DMS’s claim that 40 years of empirical research by economists has been unproductive 
rests less on a careful review of the literature (see, e.g., Cook 1980; Nagin 1998; Levitt 
and Miles 2007) than on several time-series plots of national crime rates juxtaposed with 
a potentially causal variable.  Two of these causal variables relate to the core issue in the 
economics of crime -- the deterrent effect of the threat of criminal sanctions -- and are 
plausibly important:  the arrest rate, and the size of the police force.  In my comments I 
will focus on these two variables.  Two other variables, the execution rate and the 
imprisonment rate, are relevant to deterrence but of less interest.  Execution is a very rare 
sanction in practice and the execution rate tells us very little about the likelihood or 
severity of punishment for the typical murder (Cook, in press).  The imprisonment rate 
has a theoretically ambiguous relationship to crime.
1    
 
The method of empirical inquiry by which DMS reach their damning conclusion is, 
ironically, far less sophisticated than the literature they critique.  From the first 
econometric studies that were published on the effect of sanction threat on crime (Ehrlich 
1973; Carr-Hill and Stern 1973; Sjoquist 1973)  economists have recognized and 
attempted to address the reasonable supposition that crime rates are determined by many 
factors, not just the sanction-threat level.  These pioneers also recognized that variables 
like the arrest rate and police per capita are simultaneously determined with crime rates, 
and estimating the deterrent effect requires dealing with a difficult identification problem.  
Contributors to this field have in recent years developed creative efforts to solve this 
identification problem, with some success (Levitt and Miles 2007).  In any event, the 
current study is a giant step backward methodologically speaking – back to the early 
work of criminologists who were computing simple correlations (Gibbs 1968). 
 
                                                 
1 As demonstrated by Blumstein and Nagin (1978), the relationship between crime and the imprisonment 
rate is not monotonic.  At a low probability, an increase in the probability is likely to generate an increase 
in the imprisonment rate; at a high probability, an increase in probability may well generate a reduction in 
the imprisonment rate.  The logic is identical to the relationship between price and revenue along a demand 
curve. Indeed, DSM confess that their approach is problematic, in that it “suffers two large 
defects: the right model is multifactorial, and the raw correlation between crime and a 
potential determinant can be misleading in the presence of endogeneity.”  They justify 
their naïve approach with the odd claim that their approach “does not prove a multivariate, 
‘instrumented’ analysis would not uncover a different effect, but it suggests this outcome 
is not especially likely...”   So, they conclude, a simple bivariate association is enough to 
tell us the big-picture story with a high degree of confidence.  Not so. 
 
Take the case of the variable “police per capita.”  What DMS seem to be arguing is that if 
police per capita has an important deterrent effect on crime, then the intertemporal 
correlation between crime rates and police variable will be negative pretty much 
regardless of socioeconomic, demographic, cultural, and policy changes that have 
occurred over the period.  That is a particularly strange claim given that we know (and 
the early econometric studies recognized) that there is another relationship between crime 
rates and police per capita,  that reflects the public demand for public safety.  We thus 
have two relationships, both plausibly strong, that have opposite signs: 
 
  Supply of offenses:   crime rates negatively related to police per capita 
  Demand for safety:  police per capita positively related to crime. 
 
There is an obvious analogy here between supply and demand in goods markets.  If the 
observed time series data are generated by shifts in the supply of offenses schedule (due 
to demographic or cultural change, say), then the data will trace out the positively sloped 
demand function.  So if we in fact observe a positive relationship, that tells us nothing at 
all about whether the supply of offenses is responsive to the threat embodied in increases 
in police. 
 
There is also a fundamental problem with DMS’s analysis of the arrest rate.  DMS use 
arrests per capita as their proxy for the theoretically correct variable, namely the 
probability of arrest given crime.  What is the logical connection between arrests per 
capita and the probability of arrest given crime?  Over time, arrest per capita will be 
positively correlated with crime rates if, for example, the true probability of arrest (given 
crime) remains constant.
2   Finding that positive correlation (as do DMS) tells us literally 
nothing about the subject at hand, which is the deterrent effect of changes in the 
probability of arrest. 
 
So where do DMS end up?  They say they are focusing on the “…naïve ‘if we hire more 
police, or make more arrests, …, that will necessarily reduce crime’  perspective.”  They 
conclude that “…while one interpretation of our deterrence results is that economists do 
not have the right data to find these effects, an alternative, reasonable interpretation is 
that increases in the standard deterrence variables have small or perverse effects over the 
relevant range.”  In my judgment, DMS are 0 for 2:  they have not provided a correction 
to what economists have actually shown (since DMS’s method is far more primitive than 
the norm in the economics literature), and they have not shown that arrest rates and police 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, it is easy to show that if crime is highly deterrable with respect to the arrest probability, then 
arrest per capita is inversely related to the arrest probability. resources have “small or perverse effects” (since their results are entirely compatible with  
a strong deterrent effect).   
 
There is much reason to believe that crime rates tend to go down when the probability of 
punishment increases, other things equal.  The review essays cited above include 
evidence from natural experiments, laboratory experiments, and credible econometric 
studies.  Based on my reading of the evidence, my “naïve” prediction is that if we 
disbanded the police force the resulting crime surge would be unambiguous.   REFERENCES 
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